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Abstract
The LHC stored beam contains 362 MJ of energy at the
top beam energy of 7 TeV/c, presenting a significant risk
to the components of the machine and the detectors. In
response to this threat, a sophisticated system of machine
protection has been developed to minimize the danger, and
detect potentially dangerous situations. In this paper, the
protection of the experiments in the LHC from the machine
is considered, focusing on pilot beam strikes on the exper-
iments during injection and on the dynamics of hardware
failure with a circulating beam, with detailed time-domain
calculations performed for LHC ring power converter fail-
ures and magnet quenches. The prospects for further in-
tegration of the machine protection and experimental pro-
tection systems are considered, along with the risk to near-
beam detectors from closed local bumps.
INTRODUCTION
The Large Hadron Collider at CERN will operate in
proton-proton or ion-ion collision mode, with two beams
housed in a 27 km tunnel. The machine is composed of 8
sectors, with 8 arcs and 8 long straight sections, and there
are currently 6 approved experiments spread over 4 inter-
action regions. The stored proton beam at the top energy
of 7 TeV/c and at nominal intensity contains 362 MJ of
energy, which is a considerable increase over existing ma-
chines and presents considerable risk to the elements of the
machine. This beam also presents considerable risk to the
experiments, particular when the experiments present de-
tector regions close to the beam (near-beam experiments).
For example, the forward region of the CMS experiment
contains the TOTEM [1] experiment, comprising of a set of
roman pots sitting as close as 10 σ from the 7 TeV/c pro-
ton beam, which is almost as close as some elements of the
collimation system. The effective protection of these near-
beam experiments requires integration into the primary ma-
chine protection system [2] and ensuring they are as fully
protected as possible from beam strikes.
In this paper, the protection of all the LHC experiments
from the machine is considered and the degree of protec-
tion evaluated during injection of setup bunches and during
normal operation with stored circulating beams. It is very
challenging to completely and reliably protect the experi-
ments throughout the life of the LHC and sometimes very
rare events occur, e.g. [3]. However the current systems of
machine protection provide a high level of protection for
the experiments for the nominal machine layout.
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INJECTION
The risks to the experiments when injecting arise from
the incorrect fields of magnet in the arcs or long straight
sections. These ultra-fast failure scenarios, at a time scale
of less than 1 turn, can arise from incorrectly set magnets
on injection, a communication error or from faulty hard-
ware. The subsequent first turn distorted orbit may strike
part of the machine or detector regions, causing partial loss
or a direct strike of an injected bunch. The potential im-
pact of this class of accident is reduced by the use of a
low population of injected protons - the pilot, safe or setup
bunch - where the injected number of protons is limited to
3-4×1010. This limit is set to minimise the damage caused
by beam strike, whilst still allowing operation of the ma-
chine elements. Further protection to injected beam loss
is provided by the beam interlock system, which only per-
mits injection when the LHC ring is ready for beam, and
the magnet current interlocks, which are done in software
and controlled by the Software Interlock System (SIS).
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Figure 1: The range of compensation dipole corrector
(MBXWH) settings which are dangerous for the LHCb
beam pipe and interaction region magnets for beam 1 and
excess current in the magnet. On this plot s=0 corresponds
to the interaction point and the centre of the experimental
cavern.
The first-turn beam strikes for the experiments have
been studied for LHCb and ALICE in [4] and for AT-
LAS in [5]. Figure 1 illustrates these calculations, and
shows the envelope of injected beams which could strike
either the machine or parts of LHCb for incorrect injec-
tion settings of the LHCb compensation dipole corrector
MBXWH. Specifically, this figure shows the possible beam
strikes for beam 1, where the current in the magnet is in-
creased from nominal to the design maximum. An analo-
gous calculation for ALICE is shown in the left plot of fig-
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ure 2 for the case of a first-turn field error in the separation
dipole D1, which can cause injection trajectory changes
due to the high field strength. The impact on the beam
strike scenarios with injection jitter (1.5σ in both planes)
can be seen in the right plot of figure 2, where a Monte
Carlo calculation of the beam size and envelope shows po-
tential beam strike on LHCb for errors in the final triplet
corrector MCBXH.
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Figure 2: The left plot shows a possible MBX.4L2 (D1)
dipole settings which is dangerous for the ALICE beam
pipe and interaction region magnets, where s=0 corre-
sponds to the interaction point and the centre of the ex-
perimental cavern. The right plot shows the range of the
corrector on Q1, MCBXH, settings, which are dangerous
for the LHCb beam pipe and interaction region magnets
for beam 1 and excess current in the magnet. The effects of
injection jitter and 3σ beam envelope scraping have been
included. In this plot, the beam centroid is shown in red
and the beam envelope is shown in green.
The protection from first turn beam strikes on the exper-
iments arises from only permitting injection into an empty
machine, only injecting a reduced proton bunch (pilot or
setup bunch) and from the software interlocks. These mag-
net current interlocks will provide protection from magnet
mis-settings provided they are set sufficiently tightly to pre-
vent the beam strike scenarios illustrated by figures 1 and 2.
For the IR region corrector dipoles, the software current in-
terlocks are initially set to an equivalent kick angle of 100
μ rad, which is shown in [4] to be sufficiently tight to avoid
beam accidents. Similarly, the separation dipole interlocks
are initially set to 3% of nominal current, which again is
sufficient to protect against injected beam accidents [4].
The results and level of protection for ATLAS and CMS
are similar, with some differences due to the TAS.
A further source of injection turn orbit distortion can
arise from misalignment of the final triplet, where a kick
of 100 μrad can be caused by a misalignment of the order
of 1 mm. The arguments for magnet errors apply to this
distortion and the experiments should be protected from a
kick of this magnitude.
CIRCULATING BEAM
There are a large number of failures that can impact a
stored beam, with a variety of time constants. The most
critical failures are those which happen on the shortest time
constants and strongest magnets, for example the failure
of a normal conducting separation dipole in a region of
large β-function, the quench of a string of arc dipole mag-
nets, or the failure of power converter during injection and
the subsequent setting of the output voltage to the maxi-
mum value [6, 7]. The resulting magnet field change will
cause an orbit distortion around the LHC ring for the case
of a dipole failure (including in the aperture restrictions of
near-beam experiments and in collimators), a β-beat and
tune shift for the case of a quadrupole failure and higher
order beam dynamical effects for the case of higher order
element failure, and particles will begin to touch the aper-
ture as soon as several turns after the start of the failure.
The time constant and the distribution of the loss depends
on the class of the failure and the location in the ring. The
protection against these losses takes the form of passive
absorbers installed at key locations, together with active
monitoring through beam loss monitors located close to
aperture restrictions and monitoring devices such as mag-
net current monitors. These monitoring devices are capable
of issuing a beam dump request though the beam interlock
system, which can dump the beam within several hundred
microseconds.
To demonstrate the protection of the near-beam exper-
iments from hardware failures, figure 3 shows the time-
dependent proton distribution for a 450 GeV beam with
collision optics at the TOTEM roman pots located 220 m
from the interaction point of CMS, when at t = 0 the
power converter RD1.LR1 powering the LSS1 separation
dipoles D1 fails. This failure causes an exponential change
in the separation dipole fields and a subsequent deviation
of the closed orbit around the LHC ring. The calculations
shows the orbit deviation at TOTEM occurs very rapidly
and beam loss begins within a few turns. The location of
the beam loss around the ring is shown in figure 4, where
the peaks correspond to losses on primary and secondary
collimators in LSS7. This loss would be detected on ad-
jacent beam loss monitors, triggering a beam dump, or the
fast current change in the separation dipoles would be de-
tected by a current monitor, again triggering a beam dump.
Therefore figures 3 and 4 show that the TOTEM pots are
in the shadow of the collimations system and are protected
against the failure of the power converter RD1.LR1 pro-
vided the collimators are correctly aligned. In [6], stud-
ies have been done for all the near-beam experiments for
450 GeV and 7 TeV collision optics stored beams, where it
was showed that the experiments are always in the shadow
of the collimation system for the failure scenarios consid-
ered.
The available aperture for the beam in the region of a
near-beam experiment can be reduced by the formation of
a closed local bump, which can be created the correctors
available for global orbit correction, crossing angle and
separation bump creation. The bumps can be made by an
operator or, albeit unlikely, as a result of an orbit correc-
tion algorithm. The 10σ beam distance for TOTEM corre-
sponds to 1 mm for the horizontal pot in the 220 m station,
which is the most vulnerable to local bumps. The left-hand
plot of figure 5 shows a 3-magnet horizontal closed bump
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Figure 3: The horizontal and vertical proton distribution at
the TOTEM roman pots as a function of time, for a cir-
cuit error in RD1.LR1. The calculation was made for a
450 GeV stored beam with nominal collision optics.
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Figure 4: The proton loss map around the ring for a cir-
cuit error in RD1.LR1. The calculation was made for a
450 GeV stored beam with collision optics. The major loss
spike corresponds to loss on a primary collimator.
across the 220 m TOTEM station, which is opened 199
m from the IP and closed after the TOTEM station. This
bump, with correctors strengths consistent with the orbit
correction creates a horizontal orbit distortion of +1 mm at
the 220 m TOTEM station, sending the beam into the hori-
zontal pot on the outside edge of the beam pipe. The right-
hand plot in figure 5 shows the possible vertical bumps
at 220 m, which cannot impact the vertical detectors if
the vertical correctors are kept within their limits (this ex-
cludes the allowance of global orbit correction, which pro-
vides a further safety margin). The correctors used to ap-
ply the local bumps across TOTEM are slow, and change
at 0.5 A/s and so a bump of 1mm at TOTEM will be ap-
plied over a long timescale of many seconds. However, it
should be noted that there are many ways to create closed
bumps across the experiment and the subsequent reduction
of aperture in this region is potentially very dangerous to
the near-beam detectors.
Finally, the possibility exists of an circulating beam
asynchronous beam dump, where an abnormal orbit prop-
agates around the LHC ring. This can potentially cause
a large orbit distortion around the near-beam experiments
and potential beam loss. For further details and a full dis-
cussion see [8].
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Figure 5: The formation of horizontal and vertical local
closed bumps across the TOTEM 220 m station. The avail-
able correctors can make a dangerous horizontal bump, but
not a vertical bump. The black line shows the ideal orbit,
the red line shows the bumped orbit and the blue line de-
notes the physical boundary of the TOTEM pot.
CONCLUSION
In this paper the protection from the LHC machine of
the experiments is reviewed. From ultra-fast injection turn
beam strikes the experiments are protected from by only
permitting reduced population proton bunches to be in-
jected into an empty machine, coupled with the use of soft-
ware interlocks on the magnet currents. This provides suf-
ficient protection for all experiments provided the software
interlocks are maintained. Longer-timescale scenarios can
be found for a stored circulating beam, when a magnet fails
or quenches, or a power converter fails. The protection
against these kinds of scenarios comes from well-aligned
passive protection systems, ensuring the experiments are in
the shadow of the collimators, and the use of active mon-
itoring devices connected to the beam interlock system.
These systems should provide sufficient protection for the
experiments. Finally, local bumps across experiments can
reduce the available aperture significantly, and their forma-
tion needs to be carefully monitored using the beam loss
monitor and magnet current interlock systems.
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